

EXTENDED ESSAY TITLE PAGE

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Introduction

Indian independence was achieved in 1947, following partition of the British Raj.¹ In the polarized climate of the Cold War, it was expected that India, as the world's largest democracy would join the US-led bloc.²

Contrary to such expectations, India would proceed to become a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), shunning the bipolar power struggle in favour for "Nehru's international politics of friendship."³ Beyond moving away from alignment with the US, India would also sign the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, a military alliance with the communist Soviet Union.⁴

During Eisenhower's Republican Presidency, changes were made regarding America's South Asia policy.⁵ Given the bipolar nature of the Cold War, changes in India's bilateral relations with the US were bound to affect Indo-Soviet relations. Therefore, the research question of this extended essay is: **To what extent were positive Indo-Soviet relations a result of US foreign policy during the Eisenhower and Kennedy (1953-1963) administrations?** In today's rapidly polarizing climate that is increasing reminiscent of the Cold War, the study of how

¹ Kuldip S. Bajwa, *India's National Security: Military Challenges and Responses* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2008), 60.

² S.D. Muni, *India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension* (Delhi: Foundation Books, 2009), 9; R.K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), 176; Siverson, Randolph M., and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991): 303. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/174148>.

³ Natasa Miskovic, "Introduction," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, ed. Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tine, Nada Boskowska (New York: Routledge, 2014), 4; Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*, ed. J. Edkins, N. Vaughan-Williams (New York: Routledge), 46.

⁴ Kapur, Ashok, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance," *Asian Survey* 12, no. 6 (1972): 464. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/2643044.

⁵ Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991* (National Defense University Press, 1992), 99.

India constructed their foreign policy in a bipolar world is valuable, thus making this question worthy of study.

Scholars supporting the position that US foreign policy was the cause of positive Indo-Soviet relations have argued that the US tendency toward a hegemon-like anti-Communist position in the democratic bloc pushed India away from the US, thus promoting positive Indo-Soviet relationships.⁶

However, academics including international politics expert Priya Chacko have reframed the Indo-Soviet friendship in the ideological context of the Cold War, proposing that ideological similarities between India and the USSR were the main cause of positive Indo-Soviet relations.⁷ They posit that US foreign policy was only antagonistic to India because of ideological differences between both nations.⁸

In contrast with the previous positions, economists and military analysts have taken an Indo-centric position, focussing on Indian policymakers instead.⁹ They argue that Soviet economic and military incentives offered to India motivated Indian policymakers to form a good relationship with the USSR.¹⁰

Therefore, this essay will evaluate the roles of US foreign policy, ideology, and Indian domestic considerations to answer the research question.

⁶ David M. Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 154.

⁷ Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 51.

⁸ Andrew B. Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 158; Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 45-46.

⁹ P.C. Jain, *Economic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years (1947-64)* (New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing, 2012), 126.

¹⁰ Sergey Lounev, "Soviet-Indian Relations (1955-1971): The Birth of a Friendship," in *Indo-Russian Diplomatic Relations: Sixty Years of Enduring Legacy*, ed. Andrei M. Nazarkin and Padma Lochan Dash (Delhi: Academic Excellence, 2008), 216-217.

US Foreign Policy

In evaluating US foreign policy, it must be acknowledged that US foreign policy “[took] place at three different levels”¹¹: the global, regional, and bilateral. India’s objections to US policy at all three levels have led scholars to conclude that US policy acted as a push factor in Indo-US relations, promoting positive Indo-Soviet relations.¹²

A key source in evaluating Indian reactions to US foreign policy is the anthology *Indo-Russian Diplomatic Relations: Sixty years of enduring legacy*, a collection of papers written regarding Indo-Soviet diplomatic ties.¹³ The source is valuable with respect to its origins; a collection of papers by Indian and Russian foreign policy experts, the anthology contains a rich diversity in Indian and Russian scholarship that is unavailable elsewhere. The source is also valuable with respect to its purpose – many of the papers in the anthology seek to explain the cause of the Indo-Soviet relationship, and therefore discuss the impact of US foreign policy on Indo-Soviet ties.¹⁴

Fundamentally divergent worldviews between US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru led to Indo-US tensions during the Eisenhower administration.¹⁵ Dulles was a staunch anti-communist that

¹¹ Kochanek, Stanley A., "US Foreign Policy in South Asia," *Pakistan Horizon* 46, no. 3/4 (1993): 17. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/41393438>.

¹² Rothermund, Dietmar, "India and the Soviet Union," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 386 (1969): 79-80. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/1037616>.

¹³ *Indo-Russian Diplomatic Relations: Sixty Years of Enduring Legacy*, ed. Andrei M. Nazarkin and Padma Lochan Dash (Delhi: Academic Excellence, 2008).

¹⁴ Ranjana Mishra, "Changing Contours of Indo-Russian Strategic Relations," in *Sixty Years*, 45; Lounev, "Birth of a Friendship," 210-211; Rama Sampath Kumar, "Indo-Russian Relations: Economic Opportunities or Continued Stagnation?," in *Sixty Years*, 224.

¹⁵ Brodtkin, E. I., "United States and to India and Pakistan: The Attitudes of the Fifties," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 43, no. 4 (1967): 665. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/2612804.

supported the strategy of 'massive retaliation,' a "maximum [nuclear] deterrent."¹⁶ However, Nehru was an advocate for world peace and denuclearization, supporting non-alignment.¹⁷ This difference was acknowledged by US National Security Council Report 5701, which stated that "Indian policy...will on occasion bring India into opposition with U.S. programs,"¹⁸ a claim supported by the "United States [favouring] 'stronger methods in dealing with Communism' than New Delhi"¹⁹ during the Korean War. The hard-line approach taken by Dulles toward communism was criticized as a "single-minded occupation [that was] hysterical"²⁰ by Indians. Therefore, different foreign policy beliefs prevented Indo-US cooperation with regards to dealing with communism.

¹⁶ Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 101; Hugh Ross, *The Cold War: Containment and its Critics* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), 29-31.

¹⁷ S. Kalyanaram, "Nehru's Advocacy of Internationalism and Indian Foreign Policy," in *India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases*, eds. Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), 153-154; Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 45.

¹⁸ "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, South Asia, Volume VIII – Office of the Historian." n.d. Accessed August 5, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d5>.

¹⁹ Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 104.

²⁰ R, "India and the Cold War," *Middle East Journal* 0, no. 3 (1955): 263. Accessed August 5, 2019.




Diagram 1: World map with communist nations in red and members of SEATO and/or CENTO in blue, created with mapchart.net.²¹

Regionally, the American policy of alliance formation in South Asia antagonized India, worsening Indo-US relations.²² American formation of military pacts such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was intended to contain the USSR, through “building a chain of alliances around the borders of the USSR.”²³ However, India was opposed to military alliances, including the Asia-based alliances of CENTO and SEATO, which shared borders with India.²⁴

As evidenced in **Diagram 1**, SEATO and CENTO members formed a chain along the Soviet Union’s southern border. India’s geographic position meant that it would be dragged into a war between the American-led bloc and the Soviets, leading

²¹ “Create Custom Map – MapChart.” n.d. Accessed August 5, 2019. <https://mapchart.net/>.

²² Mishra, “Changing Contours of Indo-Russian Strategic Relations,” in *Sixty Years*, ed. Nazarkin and Dash, 45; Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought,” in *India’s Grand Strategy*, 118.

²³ David Rees, *The Age of Containment: The Cold War 1945-1965* (Macmillan Education, 1965), 55; Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 84; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates. 1965. “Indo-Pakistani Problems.” <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010017-2.pdf>.

²⁴ Kalyanaraman, “Nehru’s Advocacy,” in *India’s Grand Strategy*, 169.

Indian Prime Minister Nehru to disapprove of superpower-led regional alliances.²⁵ Speaking at the United Nations in 1956, Nehru criticized military alliances as “completely out of place,”²⁶ later accusing America of neo-colonialist tendencies in other settings.²⁷ Therefore, it is evident that India took offense at America’s regional alliance policies, leading to worsened Indo-US relations.

Bilaterally, US-Pakistan rapprochement during the Eisenhower administration led to stronger Indo-Soviet relationships. In 1954, the United States began arms sales to Pakistan, “advancing the policy of containment of Communism.”²⁸ By 1959, Pakistan had received \$875 million in military aid from America, with America providing over 25% of Pakistan’s military funding.²⁹

²⁵ SHARMA, RITU, "NEHRU'S WORLD-VIEW: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SUPERPOWERS' MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS," *India Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (1989): 327. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/45072334>; Pant, Pushpesh, "INDIA AND ASIA : CHANGING PERSPECTIVES," *India Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (1984): 42. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/45071931>.

²⁶ "Speech by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru in the United Nations General Assembly, New York, December 20, 1956." n.d. Accessed August 5, 2019. <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/46977lms11.pdf>

²⁷ Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 121-122.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 112.

²⁹ Afroz, S, "The cold war and United States military aid to Pakistan 1947–1960: A reassessment," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 17(1) (1994), 61. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.1080/00856409408723198.

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959*
Defence expenditure of Pakistan's government	150.0	185.0	199.5	204.0	210.0	223.0
US military assistance	-	87.1**	90.1	109.6	84.8	75.8
Total military expenditure	150.0	272.1	289.6	313.6	294.8	298.8
US assistance as a percentage of total expenditure	-	32.01%	31.11%	34.95%	28.77%	25.37%
*Estimated values						
**Cumulative through 1955						

Table 1: American contributions to Pakistan's defence expenditures from 1954-1959 (in millions of dollars).³⁰

As a result of strained relations between India and Pakistan, a CIA report published in 1954 concluded that American provision of arms to Pakistan would “possibly [lead] to more friendly Indian relations with [the USSR].”³¹ As predicted, India reacted with “an irate outcry against the United States,”³² with David Malone postulating that “in retaliation to the USA-Pakistan military relationship, Nehru had ‘relaxed’ his policy of non-alignment to seek support from the [USSR].”³³ Therefore, it is clear that American military aid to Pakistan spurred the development of positive Indo-Soviet relations.

In short, it is argued that “[America and India] fell out because they disagreed on national security issues of fundamental importance,”³⁴ with US foreign policy decisions such as alliance formation and arms sales to Pakistan threatening Indian

³⁰ Afroz, “United States Military Aid to Pakistan,” 64.

³¹ Central Intelligence Agency. 1954. “THE PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF A US DECISION TO GRANT OR DENY MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN.” <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp98-00979r000200320001-4>; Brown, *Modern India*, 391

³² Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 114.

³³ Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 156.

³⁴ Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, xiii.

sovereignty and security. Therefore, Indian policymakers were forced to seek Soviet support for self-protection, leading Indian scholars such as Sreemati Ganguli to the conclusion that US foreign policy was the primary cause of positive Indo-Soviet relations.³⁵

Despite the conclusion reached regarding the impact of US foreign policy on Indo-Soviet relations, *Sixty Years* is limited with respect to its content; many contributors to the anthology such as Ganguli view India's foreign policy as purely reactionary.³⁶ Instead of treating Indian foreign policy as a product of Indian requirements, contributors ascribe Indian foreign policy to changing US attitudes in foreign policy.³⁷ This narrow view fails to appreciate the intricacies of foreign policy, limiting the value of the source. *Sixty Years* is also limited with respect to its origins; as an anthology to celebrate sixty years of positive Indo-Soviet relations, the authors are biased toward portraying Indo-Soviet relations in a positive light, therefore leading to greater emphasis on factors such as comradeship.³⁸

Furthermore, US foreign policy must also be placed within the appropriate context. In the case of US arms sales to Pakistan, the US repeatedly assured India that US military aid to Pakistan would not be used against India, with Dulles publicly stating that "any possible aid would pose no 'reasonable' threat to India."³⁹

³⁵ Mishra, "Changing Contours," 45; Kumar, "Economic Opportunities or Continued Stagnation?," 224; Sreemati Ganguli, "Is Russia Still Relevant For India?," in *Sixty Years*, 285; Rajendra Prasad, "Synergy Promotion in Indo-Russian Strategic Ties," in *Sixty Years*, 445.

³⁶ Mishra, "Changing Contours," 45; Kumar, "Economic Opportunities or Continued Stagnation?," 224; Sreemati Ganguli, "Is Russia Still Relevant For India?," in *Sixty Years*, 285; Rajendra Prasad, "Synergy Promotion in Indo-Russian Strategic Ties," in *Sixty Years*, 445.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ M.T. Desai, "Indo-Russian Relations for a Better International Order," in *Sixty Years*, 309.

³⁹ Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 109-111.







	INDIA	PAKISTAN
AIR		
LAND		
NAVY		

Diagram 2: Relative sizes of Pakistani and Indian armies in 1956, produced on Microsoft PowerPoint 2016.⁴⁰

As evidenced by **Diagram 2**, India’s military was large enough that arming Pakistan would not affect the Indo-Pakistan military balance significantly, thereby supporting Dulles’ claim that Pakistan was of no reasonable threat to India. Therefore, scholars who have argued that US arms aid to Pakistan was a catalyst for stronger Indo-Soviet relations have adopted an excessively narrow viewpoint, failing to grasp the context in which such arms transactions occurred.

⁴⁰ Central Intelligence Agency. 1956. “National Intelligence Estimate Number 52-56: Probable Developments in Pakistan.” <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R01012A007900030001-3.pdf>; Defense Intelligence Agency. 1973. National Intelligence Survey 35: India – Armed Forces.” <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110057-1.pdf>.

Ideology

In addition, such Indian reactions to US foreign policy can also be attributed to ideological differences. Ideological beliefs are defined as “a set of closely related ideas held by a group,”⁴¹ and India’s ideology was equivalent to that of Nehru’s, to the extent that “India’s policy has come to mean in the minds of people everywhere the personal policy of [Nehru].”⁴²

Priya Chacko’s book *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947-2004* is valuable with respect to its purpose and content; the source is focused on explaining India’s foreign policy using a Nehru-centric approach, therefore providing insight into Indian policymaking.⁴³ Furthermore, the book is valuable with respect to its content, which contains insights from a postcolonial perspective.⁴⁴

Contemporary theorists like Chacko have postulated that Indian opposition to ‘massive retaliation’ was a result of ideological differences, arguing that “disarmament was an important plank”⁴⁵ in Nehru’s ideology. An Indo-Soviet joint statement released in 1955 called for “a simultaneous and substantial reduction of conventional armaments,”⁴⁶ supporting Nehru’s ideology of “an active diplomacy that promoted military restraint and disarmament.”⁴⁷ Thus, Chacko argues that Indian opposition to US foreign policy can be attributed to ideological differences.

⁴¹ Alan Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World*, ed. Gordon Martel (Routledge, 1996), 6.

⁴² Jain, *Economic Determinants*, 41.

⁴³ Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy* 43.

⁴⁴ Muni, Sukh Deo. *Pacific Affairs* 86, no. 3 (2013): 657. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/43590739>.

⁴⁵ Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 40.

⁴⁶ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 225.

⁴⁷ Kennedy, *National Efficacy Beliefs*, 143.

Beyond explaining Indian reactions to US foreign policy, scholars have also postulated that India and the USSR's shared ideology was a cause of Indo-Soviet friendship.⁴⁸ Walt's *Origins of Alliance* introduces the ideological solidarity hypothesis, which claims that ideological similarity encourages alliances.⁴⁹ Encompassing issues including disarmament, non-alignment, socialism, and democracy, Nehru's ideology would therefore affect Indian relations with the USSR.⁵⁰

Nehru's admiration of Fabian socialism provided the foundation for an Indo-Soviet rapprochement.⁵¹ Returning from the Soviet Union in 1927, "Nehru spoke high about that country as a peaceful socialist country."⁵² It is argued that there was "Marxist influence in [Nehru's] vision,"⁵³ with exposure to the European Society making Nehru "both a democrat and socialist."⁵⁴ An article published in the US Naval War College Review concludes that "the ideologues and political theoreticians of the Congress Party...subscribed to the Soviet objectives of worldwide establishment of socialist order,"⁵⁵ a claim supported by former Indian foreign secretary A.P. Venkateswaran, who stated that there were "similarities in the psychological world views of Indian and Soviet leaders,"⁵⁶ and "commonalities in international issues."⁵⁷

⁴⁸ Kennedy, *National Efficacy Beliefs*, 33-35; Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 56; B.A. Desai, "India and Russia: Mnemonic Milestones," in *Sixty Years*, 518; M.T. Desai, "Indo-Russian Relations," in *Sixty Years*, 309; Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 46.

⁴⁹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*, ed. Robert Jervis, Robert J. Art, Stephen M. Walt (Cornell University Press, 1987), 38.

⁵⁰ Kennedy, *National Efficacy Beliefs*, 3; Miskovic, "Introduction" in *The Non-aligned Movement*, 3; Ganguli, B.N., "Nehru and Socialism," *The Economic Weekly*, Special Number July (1964): 1213; Muni, *Democracy Dimension*, 9.

⁵¹ A.K. Damodaran, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Communicator and Democratic Leader* (London: Sangam, 1997), 63; Mushtaq A. Kaw, "An Overview of Indo-Russian Relations," in *Sixty Years*, 182.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ G. Gopa Kumar, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress Party of India," in *Nehru and Modern India: An Anatomy of Nation-Building*, ed. G. Gopa Kumar (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2010), 75.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Sagar, Imroze, "INDO-SOVIET STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND COLLABORATION," *Naval War College Review* 34, no. 1 (1981): 14. Accessed August 5, 2019.

<http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/44635905>.

⁵⁶ Thakur, Ramesh, "India and the Soviet Union: Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Interests," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 9 (1991): 827. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/2645298.

Therefore, the shared ideology of socialism has been argued to be a cause of the Indo-Soviet friendship.

Chacko further postulates that non-alignment “was an important plank in the realization of...Nehru’s postcolonial India.”⁵⁸ Contemporary interpretations of non-alignment “in terms of a politics of friendship”⁵⁹ that was “ordained by the historical context of the times”⁶⁰ make it appear that non-alignment was an expression of Nehru’s idealism.⁶¹ Mehrish argues that the USSR supported non-alignment, even becoming “the cornerstone of Khrushchev’s own foreign policy.”⁶² Primary documents from the Soviet perspective also show Soviet support of non-alignment, with Soviet diplomats and columnists arguing in favour of non-alignment.⁶³ Therefore, by applying Walt’s ideological solidarity hypothesis, it is clear that shared ideology was a factor in causing good Indo-Soviet relations.

However, there were also ideological differences between India and the USSR. Although India and the Soviet Union both shared elements of socialist ideology, both parties harboured disagreements regarding the methods of attaining

⁵⁷ Thakur, Ramesh, "India and the Soviet Union: Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Interests," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 9 (1991): 827. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/2645298.

⁵⁸ Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*, 40.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 46.

⁶⁰ B. Ramesh Babu, "The Nehruvian Legacy: The Eternal and Ephemeral in Foreign Policy," in *Nehru and Modern India*, 135.

⁶¹ Navtej Kaur, "Nehru as a Prophet of World Peace," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 69, no. 1 (2008): 204. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxyint.lib.sg/stable/41856405>.

⁶² B.N. Mehrish, "Indian National Congress and Non-Alignment: The Quest for Peace and a New World Order," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (1985): 508. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxyint.lib.sg/stable/41855202>; Leon Lipson, "Peaceful Coexistence," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, no. 4 (1964): 872. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/1190700.

⁶³ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 248; Victor P. Karpov, "The Soviet Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and Its Implications for International Law," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, no. 4 (1964): 858. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/1190698.

socialism.⁶⁴ Additionally, Nehru's belief in democracy was at odds with the dictatorial Soviet communist ideology, leading to further tensions as a result of ideology.⁶⁵

Disagreements in methods for achieving socialism meant that socialism could not be the basis of Indo-Soviet relations. Nehru wrote that "socialism does not mean just a duplication of what has taken place in Soviet Russia,"⁶⁶ claiming that he did "not admire all that has occurred in the Soviet Union."⁶⁷ Furthermore, he remarked in *Whither India* that "however correct the ideology of the Communist International may have been, their tactics have failed."⁶⁸ From his writings, it is clear that he disagreed with Soviet policies and methods of attaining socialism such as collectivization, which caused millions of deaths.⁶⁹ These differences were arguably greater than their similarities, with Dutt stating that "there was hardly any occasion when, while accepting the Communist ideal, [Nehru] did not make it clear that he did not approve of many of the contemporary developments in the Soviet Union."⁷⁰ Thus, the presence of such differences between India and the Soviet Union about the method of achieving socialism meant that ideological bonding over socialism could not be the cause of Indo-Soviet friendship.

Furthermore, scholars have argued that Indian democracy was a cause of Indo-Soviet frictions.⁷¹ Nehru himself felt that "full-fledged socialism and democracy

⁶⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Whither India*, 4th ed, 40.

⁶⁵ Gopal, "India and Russia; The Ambit of Strategic Partnership", 70; K.P.S. Menon, "India and the Soviet Union," in *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, ed. B.R. Nanda (Vikas Publishing, 1976), 135.

⁶⁶ Damodaran, *Nehru: A Communicator*, 65.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 66.

⁶⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Whither India*, 4th ed, 40.

⁶⁹ Chris Ward, *Stalin's Russia*, 2nd ed (London: Arnold, 1999), 93.

⁷⁰ Rabindra Chandra Dutt, *Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru* (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1981), 6.

⁷¹ Gopal, "India and Russia; The Ambit of Strategic Partnership", 70; Menon, "India and the Soviet Union," in *Indian Foreign Policy*, 135.

were opposed to each other.”⁷² This viewpoint is supported by Cold War expert Herbert Dinerstein, who claimed that “formal alliances between communist and non-communist states were not contemplated”⁷³ post-WW2 because of ideological tensions.⁷⁴ Thus, it is argued that differences between Indian democracy and Soviet-style socialism meant that the Indo-Soviet relationship could not have been formed based on ideological grounds. However, while true in Stalin-era Russia, this tension was noticeably absent under Khrushchev, with a strong Indo-Soviet relationship being formed instead.⁷⁵ Therefore, the impact of democracy on Indo-Soviet relations from 1953-1963 would have been negligible.

Beyond Indo-Soviet ideological differences, the argument for ideology as the primary cause of positive Indo-Soviet relations is further limited by Chacko’s work. *Indian Foreign Policy* is limited with respect to its content; international relations scholar S.D. Muni characterizes the postcolonial perspective adopted as “both redundant and uncalled for,”⁷⁶ with the author failing to draw upon key sources.⁷⁷ It is also limited with respect to its purpose of developing a postcolonial interpretation of Indian foreign policy; while applicable to post-Cold War international studies, postcolonial theory has been shown to be inapplicable in the Cold War.⁷⁸ Instead,

⁷² Jain, *Economic Determinants*, 83.

⁷³ Dinerstein, Herbert S., “The Future of Ideology in Alliance Systems,” *Journal of International Affairs* 25, no. 2 (1971): 240. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/24356523>.

⁷⁴ Lambeth, Benjamin S. 1976. “Review of Herbert S. Dinerstein. The Making of a Missile Crisis, October 1962.” Baltimore. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a037893.pdf>.

⁷⁵ Vinod, M.J., “ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIA : CONTRASTING APPROACHES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,” *India Quarterly* 46, no. 1 (1990): 21. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/45063807>.

⁷⁶ Muni, Sukh Deo. *Pacific Affairs* 86, no. 3 (2013): 659. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/43590739>.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Jaeger, Hans-Martin, “REVISITING CONSTRUCTIONAL DEFECTS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR,” *European Review of International Studies* 3, no. 3 (2016): 24-25. Accessed August 5, 2019. <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/26583583>.

traditional scholarship has focused on a neorealist approach toward inter-bloc politics in the Cold War.⁷⁹

To summarize, modern scholarship has approached the Indo-Soviet relationship from a postcolonial perspective, drawing upon a wealth of primary sources such as the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru to argue that ideology was the main motivator of the Indo-Soviet friendship. Through their constructivist lens, the common beliefs in socialism, disarmament, and non-alignment naturally lead to the formation of the Indo-Soviet friendship. However, their arguments are limited by their application of a constructivist, postcolonial approach, which is grossly inappropriate in the context of the realist, bipolar Cold War environment that India was situated in.⁸⁰ While it could be said that “the impact of ideology should be greater in a bipolar world,”⁸¹ the dominant theories in classical international relations focus on a structural realist approach that treat ideology as a non-factor in alliance formation.⁸² This focus on structure as opposed in studying the Cold War can be attributed to a multitude of factors, including the institutionalization of world politics through institutes like the United Nations, and the potentialities of major war.⁸³ Therefore, ideological similarities between India and the Soviet Union cannot solely explain the Indo-Soviet friendship.

⁷⁹ Sørensen, Georg, "IR Theory after the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 83. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/20097562>; JOHN, M.S., "REALISM NEOREALISM AND CRITICAL THEORY : A GENERAL ESSAY.," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 1 (1993): 137-138. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/41855644>.

⁸⁰ Walt, Stephen M., "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (1998): 41. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/1149275.

⁸¹ Walt, *Origins of Alliance*, 38.

⁸² Slaughter, Anne-Marie. n.d. "International Relations, Principle Theories." Accessed August 5, 2019. https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf; John G. Ikenberry, "Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition," *International Studies* 46, no. 1&2 (2009): 213. Accessed August 5, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600213>.

⁸³ James, Patrick, "Structural Realism and the Causes of War," *Mershon International Studies Review* 39, no. 2 (1995): 182-183. doi:10.2307/222750.

Pragmatism

In contrast to the constructivist approach of postcolonialism, the structuralist approach of neorealism seeks to explain foreign relations in terms of the acquisition of power, and in India's case, the "preservation of her territorial integrity."⁸⁴ Scholars have argued that India's foreign policy was inherently pragmatic, quoting Nehru in stating that "ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy."⁸⁵ In Brown's work on the rise of Indian democracy, she argues that Indian foreign policy focused on "[India's] urgent need for foreign aid to finance her economic development,"⁸⁶ while maintaining non-violent relations with Pakistan, China, the USA, and the USSR.⁸⁷ Therefore, scholars have studied the impact of economic, military, and geopolitical considerations on Indian foreign policy.

International relations scholars have also reconceptualized non-alignment in terms of pragmatist policy, as opposed to having an ideological basis. Brown and Desai have claimed that non-alignment was a means of "secur[ing] foreign policy autonomy,"⁸⁸ while David Malone further argues that India was "cloaking its power plays in moral rhetoric."⁸⁹ In short, there is a large body of literature that argues that India's non-alignment was a façade intended for India to expand its global influence,

⁸⁴ Autio, Emilia. 2008. "Testing Waltzian Neorealism in a Rhetorical Analysis of India's Power in the Post-Cold War Politics." University of Tampere. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fc65/b0df042f83bc930e36585c2835fbc72dd555.pdf>; Judith Margaret Brown, *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy*, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 381.

⁸⁵ Jain, *Economic Determinants*, 29.

⁸⁶ Brown, *Modern India*, 391.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Desai, "Indo-Russian Relations for a Better International Order," in *Sixty Years*, 308; Brown, *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy*, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 381.

⁸⁹ Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 156.

whilst maintaining the moral high ground in diplomacy.⁹⁰ Furthermore, it is postulated that Soviet support for non-alignment was caused by pragmatic reasons, with Soviet 'peaceful coexistence' acting as a front for the consolidation of territorial gains made in the 1940s.⁹¹ Therefore, it is postulated that pragmatic thought dominated Indian motivations with respect to its alignments in foreign policy.

One key source in evaluating the influence of pragmatic needs on India's foreign policy is the Indian government's *2nd Five Year Plan*.⁹² The source is valuable with respect to its origin; an official document regarding India's economic development for 1956-1961, it provides information regarding the priorities of the Indian government during that time period. Furthermore, the source is valuable with respect to its contents; the specific details regarding foreign economic assistance inform the reader about India's foreign alignment.

Economic scholars have argued that the need for Soviet assistance in developing India's economy was a major factor in developing positive Indo-Soviet relations. Former Indian Minister of Finance Shri John Mathai "consider[ed] that foreign capital is necessary in [India],"⁹³ with former diplomat Shaila Pant arguing

⁹⁰ Babu, "The Nehruvian Legacy: The Eternal and Ephemeral in Foreign Policy," 135; US Library of Congress. n.d. "India – Foreign Relations," Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://countrystudies.us/india/122.htm>.

⁹¹ Edmund Demaitre, "Soviet-Indian Relations-Neutralism and Communist China," *The Russian Review* 22, no. 4 (1963): 406-409. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/126673; Warren Lerner, "The Historical Origins of the Soviet Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, no. 4 (1964): 870. Accessed August 5, 2019. doi:10.2307/1190699; V.P. Dutt, "Detente and Non-alignment," *India International Centre Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (1976): 59. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/23002005>; Bernard S. Morris, "Continuity of Communist Strategic Doctrine Since the Twentieth Party Congress," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 317 (1958): 131-132. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sg/stable/1031086>.

⁹² Government of India. n.d. "2nd Five Year Plan." Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html>.

⁹³ L.K. Garg, *A Collection of Speeches of Indian Prime Ministers* (New Delhi: Axis Publications, 2010), 26.

that “the main thrust of India’s foreign economic policy was to approach [the USSR] for larger and favourable flow of aid.”⁹⁴




Diagram 3: Cumulative graph of the number of economic agreements signed between India and the Soviet Union from 1953-1963, produced on Microsoft Excel 2016.⁹⁵




Diagram 4: Graph of the volume of Indo-Soviet trade from 1953-1963 (in hundred thousand rupees), produced on Microsoft Excel 2016.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Shaila Pant, *History of India’s Diplomatic Missions: Formative Years* (Delhi: Shakthi Book House, 2008), 22.

⁹⁵ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 551-558.

As evidenced by **Diagrams 3 and 4**, the USSR was responsible for a significant quantity of India's foreign trade and investment. India's Second Five Year Plan was based on the Mahalanobis model of development, which "gave first priority of investment in heavy industries,"⁹⁷ with "production of capital goods as the first priority."⁹⁸ The Indian focus on heavy industry was aided by the Soviet Union being "the only major power to allow India to development independent capabilities in many spheres of heavy industry,"⁹⁹ with half of India's heavy industry projects in the Second Five Year Plan "built with the help of the Soviet Union."¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the Soviet support for India's economic development was a key factor in developing Indo-Soviet relations.

In addition to economic needs, India's military considerations were also a major factor in developing the Indo-Soviet relationship. India faced many security threats, including "an actively hostile Pakistan, a proactive China, and the cold war."¹⁰¹ Despite such threats, Nehru "failed to understand the place of armed power in the formulation and conduct of state policy,"¹⁰² resulting in "down grading and operational decline of the armed forces."¹⁰³ Following military conflicts such as the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, India was forced to "enhance its military capabilities."¹⁰⁴

⁹⁶ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 577.

⁹⁷ P. Arjun Rao, "Nehruvian Legacy: Democratic Socialism and Strategy of Economic Development: An Appraisal," in *Nehru and Modern India*, 51.

⁹⁸ S.S. Bhandare, "Economic Progress in the Context of Industrialisation and Globalisation," in *Contemporary India: Transitions*, ed. Peter Ronald deSouza (California: Sage Publications, 2000), 78; Government of India, "2nd Five Year Plan," Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html>.

⁹⁹ Garg, *Collection of Speeches*, 3.

¹⁰⁰ Lounev, "Birth of a Friendship", 213.

¹⁰¹ Bajwa, *India's National Security*, 85.

¹⁰² Ibid, 86.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 87.

¹⁰⁴ Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 309.

This resulted in “big-scale military cooperation”¹⁰⁵ between the Soviets and India, with over US\$7.7 billion of arms provided between 1950-1971.¹⁰⁶ A CIA report published in 1968 asserts that “military aid is a major source of Soviet leverage,”¹⁰⁷ acknowledging the impact of Soviet military aid on its influence over third world nations like India.




Diagram 5: Graph of Soviet arms exports to South Asia from 1950-1971 (in US millions, adjusted for inflation), produced on Microsoft Excel 2016.¹⁰⁸

Beyond material assistance, the Soviets also supported India’s national security needs in the political arena. In the longstanding Jammu-Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, consistent Soviet support was demonstrated for the Indian position, with Khrushchev declaring the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir to belong to India in 1955, and Kosygin organizing the Tashkent summit to broker

¹⁰⁵ Lounev, “The Birth of a Friendship”, 216.

¹⁰⁶ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 589-590.

¹⁰⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. 1968. “Soviet Policy in South Asia | Weekly Summary,” Accessed August 5, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A006700080003-0.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 569-590.

peace in 1965.¹⁰⁹ During the 1962 border war, the Soviets also expressed their desires for negotiation through *Pravda* editorials, with Khrushchev “openly stating that China’s attack on India had been unnecessary.”¹¹⁰

In short, it is argued that positive Indo-Soviet relations were developed despite ideological barriers due to the support offered by the Soviets to India during the period of 1953-1963. In addition to material support in the form of advanced heavy machinery for the economy and military equipment for the military, the USSR also supported Indian geostrategic interests at global platforms such as the United Nations. Using Walt’s foreign aid hypothesis, which claims that an asymmetric dependence for aid increases the likelihood of alliance formation¹¹¹, it is evident that Soviet assistance was a key factor in prompting the Indo-Soviet friendship.

However, India also received large amounts of developmental aid from other parties. Echeverri-Gent claims that “US developmental assistance in India has made significant contributions to India’s economic progress,”¹¹² with “a peak of \$902 million in 1966.”¹¹³ Shaila Pant, author of *History of India’s Diplomatic Missions* further goes on to state that “In the field of economic co-operation India’s interest in...both the Super Powers was symmetrical in nature from 1947 to 1974.”¹¹⁴ More damningly, Malone asserts that “economic considerations...were not central,”¹¹⁵ arguing instead that “political and defence relationships” took precedent.¹¹⁶ Thus, with economic aid

¹⁰⁹ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 16; Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (Columbia University Press, 2001), 46.

¹¹⁰ Raghavan, *War and Peace*, 309; Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 304.

¹¹¹ Walt, *Origins of Alliance*, 43.

¹¹² John Echeverri-Gent, “Economic Reform in India: A Long and Winding Road,” in *Economic Reform and Three Giants: U.S. Foreign Policy and The USSR, China, and India*, ed. John Echeverri-Gent, Friedemann Muller, Richard E. Feinburg (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990), 125.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Pant, *India’s Diplomatic Missions*, 29.

¹¹⁵ Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance?*, 235.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

from both the US and USSR being similar, Soviet economic aid alone was not enough to shift India's favour from the United States to the USSR.

Therefore, while India's *2nd Five Year Plan* is valuable as a source, it also has limitations with respect to its content; it is unable to offer insight into the roles of specific nations in India's economic development from 1956-1961, therefore preventing judgement between the US and USSR to be made.¹¹⁷ The source is also limited with respect to its purpose as a blueprint for government action; the source focuses on actions to be taken by the Indian government, instead of the roles of foreign powers like the USSR.¹¹⁸

Furthermore, the Soviets did not possess a monopoly over military aid, making the military assistance argument less valid. During the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, while Soviet support for India was arguably lukewarm, the US Navy deployed an aircraft carrier battle group into the Bay of Bengal to potentially provide support for the Indian military.¹¹⁹ Until 1960, Western nations such as the United Kingdom were the primary source of India's military equipment, thus invalidating the argument for a Soviet arms monopoly.¹²⁰ Therefore, the relative parity between Soviet and Western arms exports to India means that Soviet arms exports alone are insufficient to justify the Indo-Soviet alliance.

Despite the large amounts of aid provided from both parties, it is argued that Indian policymakers felt that Soviet aid was superior to Western aid due to the sincerity and suitability of the aid offered. From India's perspective, Western aid "was

¹¹⁷ Government of India. n.d. "2nd Five Year Plan." Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html>.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*, 310; Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 207.

¹²⁰ Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, *Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 92.

designed to retard and stifle the real economic growth,"¹²¹ while Soviet aid was targeted at assisting India's development. Dr. Surjit Mansingh argues that American economic assistance was constrained by free-market mechanisms that prevented the development of India's public sector, "which was so central to Nehru's economic policies,"¹²² while Soviet assistance was not. Therefore, the key selling factor of Soviet aid was its ability to directly meet India's requirements, making India choose to develop positive relations with the USSR.

To summarize, it can be argued that India's relationship with the USSR was a result of pragmatism on the part of Indian policymakers. The geographical proximity of the Soviet Union meant that alliance with them would be favourable, while their ability and willingness to aid India economically and militarily meant that it would be natural for India to seek a positive relationship with the USSR.¹²³

¹²¹ Jain, *Economic Determinants*, 133.

¹²² Mansingh, Surjit. N.d. "Indo-Soviet Relations in the Nehru Years: The View from New Delhi | Parallel History Project On Cooperative Security." Accessed August 5, 2019. http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/coll_india/NehruYears-Introduction3593.html?navinfo=96318.

¹²³ Rajen Harshe, "India's Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction," *Economic and Political Weekly* 25, no. 7/8 (1990): 399. Accessed August 5, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org.proxyint.lib.sg/stable/4395968>.

Conclusion

In conclusion, although a substantial body of scholarship has highlighted the importance of US foreign policy in guiding India's diplomatic alignments, concluding that US foreign policy was the *vera causa* in India's shift toward the Soviet Union is impossible. This is because of the limitations of their scope – their failure to consider an Indo-centric perspective in examining Indian foreign policy is a critical failure that prevents limits the strength of their argument.

While contemporary theorists like Chacko have raised a cogent argument for ideology in response to the failures of previous theorists, their constructivist approach remains fundamentally crippled by the fact that liberal theories are inadequate in explaining the Cold War, because liberalism was “focused primarily on relations within the West,” failing to deal with inter-bloc politics.¹²⁴

Finally, when adopting the neorealist model of Waltz to explain the Indo-Soviet relationship from an Indian perspective, it is clear that there were many motivations for the Indian government to seek positive relations with the USSR.¹²⁵ From heavy industrial machinery and advanced military technology to support in the United Nations, the USSR was willing to supply it all, in contrast to the limited aid provided by the Western powers.

Therefore, positive Indo-Soviet relations between 1953-1963 were mainly caused by the pragmatic approach taken to diplomacy by Indian policymakers, with US foreign policy decisions such as Cold War strategy and foreign aid policies only explaining the shift away from the US and toward the USSR. An extension to this

¹²⁴ “Dr. Priya Chacko | Staff Directory.” Accessed August 5, 2019. <https://www.adelaide.edu.au/directory/priya.chacko#>; Ikenberry, “Liberalism in a Realist World,” 211.

¹²⁵ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

investigation could study how the impact of other considerations on US foreign policy with regards to India and South Asia in general, to learn the role played by South Asia in America's global Cold War strategy.

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